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March 6, 2015
The issue of eurozone indebtedness has been brought to a head with the victory of Syriza in Greece. All three features in this latest edition of Konzept focus on Europe – in particular on the past, present and future of managing debts. [more]
Konzept Issue 03 The issue of eurozone indebtedness has been brought to a head with the victory of Syriza in Greece. All three features in this latest edition of Konzept focus on Europe – in particular on the past, present and future of managing debts. Cover story Piecing together debt, defaults and forgiveness in Europe To send feedback, or to contact any of the authors, please get in touch via your usual Deutsche Bank representative, or write to the team at research.haus@db.com The Greek crisis has owned the headlines for the past month and brought some latent issues surrounding the eurozone to the forefront of investors’ minds. This edition of Konzept explores these fundamental issues by looking at the past, present and the future of Europe. The feature on sovereign defaults provides a historical perspective by travelling back over four hundred years to draw lessons for present day policymakers and creditors from Spain’s public finances in the 16th century. Another piece evaluates the economic, political and even the moral arguments for debt forgiveness currently being put forward vociferously by emerging political voices in the European periphery. The third feature looks to the future and the possible routes and roadblocks to achieving the much vaunted fiscal union in Europe. Also pondering the roads ahead is our article on the cars of tomorrow. It picks the winners and losers from disruptive technological changes sweeping through the auto industry. Moving from the physical to the information highway, a piece on net neutrality dispels some of the common misconceptions surrounding the subject and highlights the pitfalls of a heavy- handed regulatory approach. Also warning against regulatory over-reach is our article on the resurgence of cov-lite leverage loan issuance in America. The author posits the growing popularity of these instruments reflects the changing market structure rather than greater systemic risk. If identifying risks is difficult, calculating returns is also deceptively tricky as another article points out. The complexity of measuring investment returns aside, our final article argues that the pursuit of shareholder friendly corporate governance practices by Japanese companies along with changing investor preferences in the country augurs well for stocks. We hope that by reflecting on the distant past, analysing the present and attempting to peer into the future, the latest issue of Konzept helps readers navigate the windy roads of Greece, Europe and beyond. March 2015 Editorial Konzept Articles 06 Net neutrality—a step forward to the past 08 Many happy returns 10 Changing gear in the auto industry 12 Cov-lite loans—don’t worry 14 The rebirth of corporate Japan Columns 48 Book review—Exodus 49 Ideas lab—the moon 50 Conference spy—dbAccess China 51 Eurozone map rescaled for debt Konzept Features Debt forgiveness —a European dilemma 17 Sovereign default— a case study from 16th century Spain 28 European fiscal union—at a crossroads 40 1996. This Act allows the FCC to determine whether a telecommunication service is a common carrier, and hence subject to rigorous regulatory oversight under Title ll of the Act, or an information/enhanced telecommunication service subject to a much lighter regulatory regime under Title l. As Congress wanted to give maximum room to the rapidly-evolving internet to develop and innovate, in 2002 the FCC decided that broadband services carrying high-speed internet to end-users would be regulated under Title l. The problem is that the statute specified that the FCC could not apply Title ll-type common carrier regulations to any service regulated under Title l. So currently the FCC has little leeway to implement net neutrality rules short of re- classifying broadband services under Title ll. Many people calling for net neutrality rules would also agree that trying to force internet- related services into a Title II regulatory framework designed for the monopoly world of the nineteenth century telegraph and twentieth century telephone service is akin to the nuclear option. The FCC has said that it would forebear from applying most of the regulatory powers available under Title II. But this is small comfort partly because a future FCC could pursue a different policy, and partly because if some future problem arises that has little to do with common carrier issues regulators may have little leeway to craft a remedy outside the strictures of Title II rules. At one level the Obama-administration’s thrust to implement net neutrality is a bit of a non- event. Most people already support the concept of net neutrality – that internet traffic should be treated the same regardless of source, destination or content, and that network operators should not be able to block or throttle certain traffic in favour of their own or paid priority services. And network operators generally adhere to net neutrality principles in spirit. Indeed, the debate to date has been mostly about whether formal rules are needed to ensure net neutrality.* But what makes the issue a big deal are the means to implement the proposed rules, and their scope. The reality is that net neutrality is really a stalking horse for many other issues that have broad implications for investors. The Federal Communications Commission has tried twice over the past decade to implement net neutrality rules, only to be blocked by the courts due to an obscure provision in the Telecommunications Act of Net neutrality—a step forward to the past John Tierney, Alexander Düring Konzept 6 For now much of this may be moot as the FCC will surely face court challenges that could drag on for years. In the interim it will likely be business as usual for most users and players. The scope issue is the elephant in the room, however. To date the net neutrality debate has focused on the so-called last mile, where end-users connect to an internet service provider via a broadband link, which in turn provides access to the broader internet ecosystem. There have long been concerns that ISPs could use their monopoly position to favour certain internet traffic and services over others. Another persistent voice has been smaller internet companies that have feared ISPs could develop paid priority services, where larger and wealthier companies pay for higher priority access over the final mile, thus crowding out those unable to pay. Even though there has been no pattern of ongoing abuse by ISPs, the FCC has pursued net neutrality if only to assert its authority to regulate ISP broadband network management just in case. The plot then thickened in May last year when Netflix called for “strong” net neutrality, meaning that content providers should be able to access ISPs to deliver content on an equal basis – that is, without having to pay to do so. Largely as a result of this controversy the FCC’s proposed net neutrality rules would apply not just to the final mile, but also to the interface between the ISPs and the broader internet. In the past, Netflix contracted with local networks to store and deliver its content on request. Those local networks in turn typically pay to access the ISPs via standard peering contracts. Recently, Netflix built its own networks so it can connect directly to ISPs. Netflix sought to connect to ISPs for free, even though video streaming consumes massive quantities of bandwidth. Some smaller providers accepted Netflix’s terms, but some big operators including Comcast and Verizon balked. The end result is that Netflix agreed to pay to access their networks although it does not receive preferential treatment over the final mile. Netflix has argued among other things that if it does not pay it could be subject to a degraded level of service; hence the call for “strong” net neutrality. The Netflix /ISP battle has laid bare several awkward facts, including the utter lack of transparency in how the internet business ecosystem operates, and the prospect that after several decades of untrammeled competitive development some internet players may be becoming sufficiently large that they are able to exert monopolistic leverage over other players. For example, are the large ISPs now in a position to extract unreasonably high fees from other networks? Or is Netflix the one trying to leverage its dominant position in video streaming to extract terms from ISPs unavailable to any other network? Are other companies elsewhere in the internet ecosystem now in a position to stifle competition or charge unreasonable fees? On the outside it is tricky to tell. Issues that might well have remained out of sight are now likely to receive the kind of scrutiny in the name of net neutrality that most businesses do not welcome. Depending on what emerges, regulators could start extending Title ll status to other parts of the internet, if only to assert broad regulatory authority. It is hard to say what that scenario means for internet innovation or network businesses, other than that the pure market forces that have prevailed to date will be curtailed in some way. That does not mean the FCC is wrong to pursue more robust oversight of the internet. As the internet has matured and grown in importance to society it has arguably outgrown the laissez faire framework of Title I. Apart from the rise of players with potential monopoly-type power, issues such as the Snowden affair and massive data breaches at a variety of major companies point to a growing need for a new level of oversight. But doing so by invoking Title II smacks of a forward-to-the-past approach. There is a way out. Congress could again recognise as it did in 1996 that trying to force internet regulation into the common carrier model of previous centuries is not the right answer. In an ideal world Congress would step up and create an entirely new statutory framework for internet regulation. Until that happens investors in internet-related companies should expect some combination of change and uncertainty over the medium term. * Contrary to folklore neutrality was never a founding principle of the internet; technicians always understood a need for prioritisation and network management. Given the web started as a military network, that makes sense. Even today the internet is far from neutral. Differentiated routing already occurs with Voice over IP and in Britain, for example, ISPs routinely throttle heavy users during peak times. But to date, ISPs in the US and Europe generally have not systematically discriminated against certain services or traffic, or provided paid priority service. Konzept7 Bilal Hafeez, Daniel Brehon Mathematical headaches such as this are common in currency markets. Think about the exchange rate, say, between the dollar and yen. At the end of 2011 the yen was trading at 77 yen to the dollar, but by the end of 2014 it had fallen to around 120. Had an investor bought dollars and sold yen over that period he would have made a return of 56 per cent. What about the other side of the trade? Had another investor bought yen and sold dollars at a rate of 0.013 dollars per yen (that is, one divided by 77), and likewise unwound the trade at the end of 2014, when the rate was 0.008 dollars, he would have waved goodbye to 36 per cent of his money. How can it be that from the same currency move someone could have either made 56 per cent or lost 36 per cent depending on which side of the trade he took? Where is the hidden gain or loss? There is not one of course – it is another illusion of sorts. It arises because a different numeraire is being used in each case, so a simple percentage change does not allow for a like-for-like comparison of gains and losses on the two sides of the trade. The proper way of reporting currency returns or indeed hedge fund returns as in the examples above would be to use logarithmic returns to ensure gains and losses were symmetric (or additive). Measuring currency-based returns is also a pain. Take a dollar-based manager and a euro-based manager invested in European equities throughout 2014. If both parties had simply bought the market and done nothing else, the dollar-based investor would have lost eight per cent and the euro-based investor would have made four per cent. This is due to the decline in the euro over the course of the year, which would have wiped out any equity gains for the American. By hedging the currency risk, regularly entering into one month forward contracts that lock in a given euro exchange rate, the US based investor could have mitigated some of the currency moves. But even then he would have only made 2.5 per cent – half the gain made by the European investor. One challenge when hedging is trying to estimate the expected gain or loss from future equity moves It seems so plain and simple – let investment returns speak for themselves. You would think one of the nicer aspects of finance and investing is that the purity of numbers would cut through hyperbole, marketing waffle and self-delusion. Indeed performance measurement permeates every corner of the industry. But the trouble is the more you delve into how to calculate and compare returns, the more complicated and fuzzy things become. Take an example at the most basic end of the measurement spectrum, the money manager who makes a 100 per cent return in the first year and then a minus 50 per cent return in the second. Add the two numbers and divide by two and lo and behold his average annual return is 25 per cent. But the poor investors of course have not seen a change in the value of their assets in two years. Many happy returns Konzept 8 so as to ensure the right amount is currency hedged. It would have been difficult to judge the American’s performance under this scenario. While on the subject of muddled currency- adjusted returns, a paradox of our times is that recently central banks from Switzerland to Denmark to Sweden have cut policy rates to negative territory. Yet investors can still earn a zero return if they hold cash in one of those countries. In theory at least, currency markets could be used to take advantage of this situation to make seemingly infinite risk-free returns. How is that? A US-based investor could arrange to sell dollars and buy Swiss francs in the spot market and at the same time withdraw Swiss francs from his Swiss account into cash, thereby not paying a negative interest rate on those deposits. However, he remains exposed to currency risk as the Swiss franc could weaken. This risk could be (almost) perfectly hedged by going long dollar/short francs at a forward discount since the forwards markets fully price negative Swiss deposit rates. In practice it may be difficult to find (and insure) the requisite 1,000 franc notes at sufficient leverage to make the risk-reward attractive, unless rates become very negative. But it does highlight the quirks in currency markets (as well as suggesting there is a limit to how negative rates can go in a country). A final problem with performance measurement is that one, or even a few numbers, rarely explain what could be complete chaos or luck or whatever else below the surface. Take again the more common playground of equities. Every mom and pop investor knows that stocks are prone to sharp moves. Yet since 1928 the S&P 500 has delivered what seem to be stable annual returns of 5.5 per cent (excluding dividends). But this number obscures the fact that the largest one day loss over that period was a whopping 20 per cent, which occurred in 1987. Indeed, US equities typically experience two particularly nasty daily moves a year, here defined as a three standard deviation decline. Had investors miraculously avoided those two days each year, then their annual equity returns would have shot up to 14 per cent. Of course, it works the other way round as well. There have been around 1.5 extreme positive daily moves each year. Had mom and pop missed those, then they would have lost around one per cent a year since 1928! Hence often it is not the average performance that matters, it is how investors trade the extreme returns that matters. Or perhaps in the case above the lesson is not to try to trade at all. A final problem with performance measurement is that one, or even a few numbers, rarely explain what could be complete chaos or luck or whatever else below the surface. Konzept9 Changing gear in the auto industry The global auto industry is entering a period of gear-crunching technological and regulatory change. In America regulations will compel automakers to improve their fleet-wide average fuel economy from 30 miles per gallon to 54.5 mpg within ten years. Europe has the toughest stance, requiring manufacturers to improve from 42 mpg to 58 mpg by 2020 – and is contemplating a 71-81 mpg target by 2025 though this may change. These new standards will have big implications. First there are compliance costs. We expect that more than $1,000 will be added to the cost of a vehicle in the US over the next five years. That just relates to fuel economy and does not include the cost of increased safety and other technologies that will be required. Over the next decade we estimate additional fuel efficiency costs to be more than $2,000 per vehicle. For Europe we forecast an additional $1,200 and $2,400 over the same period. The trouble is rules are tightening just as oil prices have collapsed. And consumers have been unwilling to pay for better fuel economy even at higher pump prices. What could happen to demand? Americans are unlikely to pay for fuel saving technology (which we estimate at $50 per one per cent improvement) when petrol costs less than $3 per gallon. Based on analysis by the National Bureau of Economic Research consumers apply a 15 per cent discount rate to future fuel savings. Hence at $3 per gallon (gas prices are currently $2 in the US) consumers would value the 2020 fuel economy gains at about $900 (versus the cost of $1,000). Based on historic elasticities, higher priced fuel efficient cars could potentially subtract up to 1m units from the number of cars sold annually. Who are the winners then? Technologies that improve the efficiency of conventional engines should experience extraordinary growth over the next five years. But the marginal cost of improving conventional internal combustion engines will increase as the cost of electrification continues to decline. Electrification is Rod Lache, Jochen Gehrke Konzept 10 underestimated in our view and regulatory pressure is likely to increase on diesel cars (some studies show nitrogen oxide emissions to be five times higher than stated in brochures). In fact the 25 year long boom in European diesel technology could well end. Electric cars on the other hand will be hugely important. Though sentiment may turn somewhat cautious in the near term due to falling oil prices, concerns over the payback on electrification are over-done. Various forms of electric vehicles will reach ownership cost parity with conventional diesel engines within the next five years, and parity with conventional gasoline engines by the early 2020s. This will be the inflection point in demand for electric vehicles. Most importantly battery costs will drop faster and lower compared with what most people thought not long ago. For example, the first lithium ion cells produced by Panasonic in 1990 had energy density levels of roughly 90 watt-hour per kilogram and cost $2 per watt- hour. Today’s Panasonic 18650 batteries used in Tesla cars have an energy density of approximately 233 Wh/kg and cost less than $0.20/Wh. We expect this trend to continue and apply to the overall battery industry – including the large format batteries on which most of the global car makers are betting. Meanwhile, Japanese manufacturers should have an advantage in the US mass market thanks to a weaker yen as well as their more mature hybrid engine initiatives. Luxury automakers are in turn better positioned than mass market players. For example, European mass market car companies will come under pressure as soon as cyclical tailwinds moderate. Capacity utilisation in Europe is too low to be able to pass along higher costs. Consolidation here is likely. Finally suppliers geared towards improved fuel efficiency should see exorbitant growth prospects over the coming five years. Stiff penalties for non-compliance means that negotiating power will shift from makers to suppliers. That said, the accelerated pace of product development and technological change, Please go to gmr.db.com or contact us for our in depth report: Pricing the Car of Tomorrow. as well as the regulatory shift, will also pose challenges. For example, a number of engine suppliers may be adversely impacted if the penetration of electrified vehicles increases significantly, or if new test standards in Europe impact the economics of diesel vehicles. Regulators themselves might need to change their approach as the European Commission is reviewing emissions rules for the period post 2021. The transport sector can contribute to lower CO2 emissions by improving efficiency or reducing its reliance on oil. But the reality is that overall CO2 objectives cannot be met with fuel consumption targets alone. Another problem is that emission for electric vehicles largely occur during the generation of electricity and hence under a different regulatory regime. Likewise, alternative combustion fuels such as bio-fuels have vastly different CO2 profiles. Even so, from a cost perspective electric cars should be on par with combustion vehicles sometime in the next decade. Hence, the need for targets that improve the economic viability of this technology should not be needed in the mid-term. The ultimate demand for electrified vehicles remains uncertain for now, and factors much beyond availability and cost, such as infrastructure, are not even in the industry’s hands. Ideally, regulation should be technology neutral. To conclude, the overall environment for the industry is set to change rapidly and disruptive technological changes will occur. The winners of yesterday will not be the winners of tomorrow. The last German emperor Wilhelm II once said “I believe in the horse – the car is a temporary appearance”. It took less than 20 years for the car to replace the horse in scale. The coming decade should see those dismissing electric driving as modern Wilhelm IIs. Various forms of electric vehicles will reach ownership cost parity with conventional diesel engines within the next five years, and parity with conventional gasoline engines by the early 2020s. Konzept11 Cov-lite loans— don’t worry John Tierney Bank regulators in America are becoming hot and bothered about leveraged loans. In particular, they worry about the rise of so-called cov(enant)-lite lending, which now accounts for about two-thirds of originations and is marketed to institutional investors as opposed to banks. While offering bond-type covenant protection, cov-lite loans do not contain maintenance covenants such as provisions to monitor a borrower’s leverage. The concern is that the absence of maintenance covenants is indicative of overly-frothy demand for leveraged loans and a potential rise in systemic risk in the economy. Certainly the market is large. High yield bonds and loans outstanding in the US total $2.5tn, with leveraged loans one- third of that. Regulators also fret that non- bank investors may be taking on risks they do not fully understand. Fifteen years ago, institutions accounted for about a third of the market. Today they account for 90 per cent, including collateralised loan obligation funds (60 per cent), loan mutual funds (20 per cent), distressed and other hedge funds (10 per cent), and other investors such as insurers and finance companies (10 per cent). But the shunning of maintenance covenants by institutional investors is far from irrational. For banks, the ongoing monitoring of loans and working with troubled borrowers to restructure loans is a well-established part of their lending culture – hence maintenance covenants are standard. Institutional investors, on the other hand, generally do not have this kind of infrastructure and have a history of preferring loans with bond-like covenants. These usually include a variety of incurrence covenants (which are triggered by particular events or ratios being hit) but no maintenance covenants (those that are checked regularly). The preference of institutional investors for bond-like structures was seen in the early years of the credit default swap market. Initially CDS was largely a bank product, used for hedging loan portfolios and managing risk-based capital. CDS documentation provided for a Konzept 12 variety of credit events, including failure to pay, bankruptcy, and restructuring. Restructuring proved to be problematic for non-bank investors, who were more likely to be hedging bonds than loans. In the US, bank loans are frequently restructured outside of bankruptcy court, but bond restructurings usually occur within the context of Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Thus an out-of-court loan restructuring could trigger a credit event on a bond that was still performing. That might be good for protection buyers but it exposed protection sellers to additional event risk. As the investor base of the CDS market expanded and shifted away from banks, non- bank investors successfully lobbied to remove restructuring as a standard credit event in the US. In Europe, restructuring has not been a big issue and remains a standard credit event. Bank loans remain the dominant source of financing for companies, and furthermore, since bankruptcy regimes in Europe generally do not include a US-style Chapter 11 option bond restructurings are more likely to occur out of court. It therefore makes sense that leveraged loans too would eventually be structured to meet the needs and demands of their investor base. Cov-lite loans first appeared in volume during the boom years of 2006-2007. As the institutional share of the leveraged loan market grew, cov-lite loans rose from nothing to about a quarter of originations. Hence regulators may be tempted to view the rise of cov-lite loans as a symptom of the untrammeled risk appetite of the time. But the reality is the phenomenon had more to do with the recognition – thanks to the CDS market – that it was possible to structure bank loans to be more bond-like. Regulators would have more reason to worry if maintenance covenants improved the credit performance of loans, but that is not the case. The default experience of leveraged loans has been similar to high yield bonds during both the good and bad times of the past 15 years. For much of that time (including the financial crisis) most leveraged loans carried maintenance covenants and of course bonds did not. 1 Indeed, regulators may better spend their time asking why it is that maintenance covenants seem ineffectual. One hypothesis is they make it easier for banks to avoid tough decisions about marginal borrowers. In the absence of maintenance covenants (as with bonds) a borrower either stays current on the debt or does not. If there is a failure to pay or the company files for bankruptcy the debt moves into administration. No creditor likes to face that situation, but it does result in a natural culling of the weakest companies. Hence, maintenance covenants may amplify rather than control credit risk over time, ultimately resulting in higher defaults, lower recoveries and potentially higher costs to taxpayers. Federal Reserve data suggest that the credit performance of standard bank loans is significantly worse than leveraged loans or bonds during bad times and no better during good times. It may be that the credit performance of standard bank loans would be worse without maintenance covenants but there does not seem to be a compelling case why leverage loans structured and underwritten to institutional investor standards rather than bank standards require maintenance covenants. Institutions clearly figured out some time ago that maintenance covenants are far more trouble than they are worth. Realistically, even if regulators win this battle and force institutional investors to accept loans with maintenance covenants it is unlikely to have much impact on demand for leveraged loans or the flow of credit to the high yield sector. The danger is that regulators view winning the battle as winning the war and miss the more meaningful signs of systemic risk in bank lending. 1 Moody’s default statistics for bonds include distressed exchanges and restructurings as well as outright failures to pay and bankruptcy filings. Leveraged loan default data reported by S&P Capital IQ Leveraged Commentary and Data Service counts only failures to pay and bankruptcies. The bond and loan default data from Moody’s and S&P LCD are very similar when adjusted for distressed exchanges and restructurings. Konzept13 The rebirth of corporate Japan Corporate Japan turned inward. The term Galapagos Syndrome was coined to describe Symbian-based 3G smartphones used throughout Japan for almost ten years before similar technology caught on elsewhere. Japan struggled to capitalise on its technological advantages. Hungrier foreign rivals caught up. A toxic mixture of complacency, financial pressure and risk aversion meant the fate that befell chip makers was repeated in LCDs, flat screen televisions, laptops, solar panels and batteries. Sanyo was a prominent casualty, but even innovators such as Matsushita and Sony became icons of sclerotic “old-Japan.” Not everything was bad. Softbank (mobile telecoms), Fast Retailing (Uniqlo), Fanuc (industrial robots) and KDDI (mobile telecoms) together ended up representing almost a quarter of the Nikkei 225. Most of these companies were led by charismatic personalities who adeptly read structural trends. They shortened supply chains and cut costs aggressively. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto pledged to turn himself “into a fireball”, embracing the Anglo-Saxon capitalist model in 1996, before his consumption tax hike and the Asian Financial Crisis doused the flames. But he made business restructuring and the disposal of nonperforming loans easier. Buybacks and stock options were deregulated. Prime Minister Abe proclaimed “Japan is back” but markets are not convinced. Shares have doubled since 2012, but valuations languish below their ten and twenty-year averages. The boost from a weaker yen, and lower oil prices, is seen as a one-off. Investors remain wary. To see why, it helps to understand corporate Japan’s history. The country’s postwar ascent to dominate export markets was mind- boggling. Management enjoyed excellent labour relations, worked with policymakers, had long investment horizons underwritten by cross- shareholdings and garnered strength from unassailable positions in a large and dynamic domestic economy. Stocks traded at a premium. Conventional metrics did not apply. Until of course they did. Unique characteristics quickly became millstones. The pursuit of market share over profitability proved a disaster when capital costs rose and growth faltered. “Saving face” inhibited the recognition of problems even before consensual decision-making stifled a response. Bad demographics became an excuse for caution. James Malcolm Konzept 14 Real change was palpable. There were more than 2,000 merger and acquisition transactions in 2005, up from fewer than 350 a decade before. The proxy advisory firm ISS entered the market in 2001, and shareholder dissents soon spiked. Dividend payout ratios began to increase and foreign ownership rose (to about a fifth of the market from four per cent in 1990), as cross shareholdings were unwound. But in many areas the transformation was skin-deep. Zombie firms remained supported by banks as the economy started to grow. 1 M&A was about consolidation rather than value creation. And although almost half of listed companies now had outside directors, most were figureheads. Hostile takeovers were nearly unknown, with the attempt on Shoei a notable failure in early 2000. Then came two events. One was the Olympus scandal, sensationalised in the account of its foreign figurehead. 2 The other was Tepco’s mismanagement of the Fukushima nuclear meltdown – “its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture” said one critic. 3 Both helped pave the way for Abenomics, a huge reflationary economic policy. Two years in, inflation is discouraging cash hoarding, while buybacks and larger dividend payouts are being encouraged by new corporate governance codes. For example, Amada, a machinery maker, became a poster child last spring, when its stock rallied 50 per cent on its bid for inclusion in the new return-on-equity-weighted Nikkei 400 index. More recently Aoyama Trading, a cash- rich menswear retailer, announced a five per cent stock buyback and higher payouts and saw its stock surge 50%. Change should gather momentum. Now the economy is doing better it is easier for Japanese firms to lay off workers, spin off underperforming divisions and break supply chains. In the background it is clear that the influence of shareholders on managerial decisions is growing. More outside directors and auditors also appear to have helped governance. 4 Meanwhile, businesses that have dragged on profits for years are being cut. Hitachi, Panasonic, and now Sony are emerging success stories, while Toshiba and Sharp – laggards hitherto – are seeking to follow suit. There is a shift from focusing on products and market share to profitable businesses that exploit genuine competences. For Sony that is imaging and sensors and high-end televisions. At Panasonic home and automotive related products are replacing consumer electronics. Growth strategies used to mean expanding into China. Today Japanese companies are targeting Turkey, India, Indonesia, the Middle East, Mexico, Vietnam and Myanmar, or trying to make up lost ground in mature markets. M&A has also picked up. Softbank’s $22bn purchase of Sprint, Suntory’s $16bn acquisition of Beam and Dai-ichi Life buying Protective Insurance are the most noteworthy examples. Established firms are moving into new areas too. Following the success of its online bank, Sony is bridging out into real estate. Finally, Japanese companies are leading the way in a range of cutting-edge materials, components and technologies. Exemplars are Toray, a textile maker which branched out into carbon fibre as well absorbent elements for disposable nappies; Nidec, specialising in precision motors, and Omron, which does factory automation. Some smaller companies have stunning new technology such as Cyberdyne, which rents out robotic exoskeletons for the treatment of the disabled and assisting the elderly. But when will markets reward this rebirth of corporate Japan? Possibly sooner rather than later given that large public funds have started to rebalance their bond-heavy portfolios into riskier assets. Retail investors are likely to follow, encouraged by various tax-free schemes. Almost two decades of deflation has left households sitting on $8tn in cash and deposits, and corporates another $2tn. This is a recipe for stocks being able to re-rate rapidly. 1 Debt Restructuring of Japanese Firms: Efficiency of Factor Allocations and the Debt-Labor Complementarity. Tokuo Iwaisako, Chiaki Fukuoka and Takefumi Kanou, December 2010. 2 Exposure: Inside the Olympus Scandal – How I went from CEO to Whistleblower. Michael Woodford, 2012. 3 Japanese-style Management: From Crisis to Reformation in the Age of Abenomics, Shigeo Shimizu, 2014. 4 Business Restructuring of Japanese Firms: Structural changes during the “Lost Decades”. Masayuki Morikawa, September 2013. Konzept15 Konzept 16 Lenders assume borrowers will honour their debts—that they will get their interest paid and their money back on time. While this does not always turn out to be the case, lenders generally expect to see best efforts made by the borrower before reducing the amount owed, cutting the interest rate or extending the maturity of the loan. Michal Jezek, Jean-Paul Calamaro, Alexander Düring Debt forgiveness— a European dilemma 17 Konzept Indeed, it is often seen as a moral failure by borrowers to default, and thus breach the trust placed in them, but is it always as simple as that? Might it be wrong – economically, politically, morally – for a lender not to reduce the burden of a debt? Sovereign debt forgiveness is hardly new, as we show in our feature on 16th century Spain on page 28. But political parties such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain have suddenly put debt forgiveness at the forefront of the current political and economic debate. Meanwhile, a growing international movement seeks to challenge the status quo assumption that debts must be repaid. Debt forgiveness refers specifically to a reduction in the amount owed but there are other forms of debt relief, such as interest rate cuts or maturity extensions. Yet debt forgiveness in particular evokes a combustive mix of emotions as well as moral, political and economic arguments. That is partly because no two situations are the same and lines are mostly blurred. For example, have distressed sovereigns been unlucky or reckless or both? When might a lighter debt burden lead to economic benefits that actually improve the position of creditors? Why should the taxpaying workers of some countries subsidise the tax avoiders of others – especially if the latter are richer? What causes massive debt anyway – profligate borrowing, or irresponsible lending? Such questions echo around Europe and beyond. What also makes them hard to answer is that debt is a repeated game. Decisions today have implications for decisions to be made tomorrow. And politics is politics. A political promise that debt relief is a one-off is no more credible than the promise to pay in full made earlier. Greece has been in the headlines as a vocal advocate of debt forgiveness and its new government initially adopted a radical stance vis-à-vis its creditors in this respect. Both sides stand to gain and lose something and it is the net result of their respective cost- benefit analyses that will drive the final outcome of the negotiations. So using Greece as a live case study, how should governments and their creditors think about sovereign debt relief? For sovereign borrowers the benefits of debt forgiveness are clear enough. A lower debt burden equals lower interest costs and a smaller principal repayment. This should in turn allow for a fiscal stimulus to help the economy, hopefully with a juicy multiplier. In today’s parlance: austerity ends. The risk of course is that creditors do not yield, and the result is a chaotic default. This usually brings with it wide-ranging costs. In Greece’s case it could mean exit from the Troika programme, bank losses on government bond holdings, bank runs (with likely capital controls to stop them) and the need to introduce a local currency to recapitalise banks and provide liquidity to the Konzept 18 economy. The resulting devaluation and subsequent inflation would likely be substantial. Of course, any devaluation would boost Greece’s competitiveness if not neutralised through higher wages. That said the country has already achieved substantial progress towards restoring competitiveness via a painful internal devaluation over the past few years. Eurozone exit would also mean the loss of the coveted anchor to Europe that many Greeks value. Finally, eurozone exit would be tricky. It is much easier to check into a monetary union than check out although the latter is most certainly not impossible. 1 Making such a process smooth, without investor and depositor panic, would be a tall order. We can only hope this dire scenario does not materialise. However, it needs to be stated as a necessary part of the cost-benefit analysis of the debtor. Turning to a creditor’s view of affairs, the costs of debt forgiveness are clear. There is firstly the loss of funds lent – in Greece’s case in exchange for promises of reform made by an elected government. Here there is a large potential externality to consider as well: contagion to other peripheral countries whose leaders would surely make a case for equal treatment. If they do not, their political rivals certainly will. (See box for a brief description of the anti-austerity parties in Spain, Portugal and Ireland.) For creditors, the main benefit of debt forgiveness would be avoiding the mess of Greece leaving the eurozone. But forgiving debt can be in the interest of creditors more generally: some debt relief might increase – or at least not decrease – the amount of money creditors eventually collect from the borrower. On the other hand, creditors must also factor in the implications for other borrowers. Debt forgiveness is not a zero sum game – indeed it can affect players who are not even in the game. Seen within such a cost-benefit approach Greece would naturally prefer debt forgiveness and right from the start seemed willing to risk the downside of brinkmanship. Yet creditors seem to have assessed the trade-off between financial contagion and political contagion. The danger for Greece is that it poses less of a systemic risk than in 2012, thanks to various European Central Bank initiatives since then. Thus, political contagion may well be perceived as a bigger threat to creditors than the financial one. Hence creditors may not blink when confronted by Greece, but may eventually be willing to agree to some other form of debt relief – such as maturity extension or interest re-profiling – in exchange for continued reforms. Nevertheless, narrowly focusing on the economic costs and benefits of debt forgiveness to debtors and creditors does not 1 See Peter M. Garber (1998), Notes on the Role of TARGET in a Stage III Crisis, NBER and Barry Eichengreen (2007), The Breakup of the Euro Area, NBER. 19 Debt forgiveness—a European dilemma Greece has been in the headlines as a vocal advocate of debt forgiveness and its new government initially adopted a radical stance vis-à-vis its creditors in this respect. Konzept 20 Both sides stand to gain and lose something and it is the net result of their respective cost-benefit analyses that will drive the final outcome of the negotiations. 21 Debt forgiveness—a European dilemma guarantee the best outcome for Europe. Such an approach says nothing of what should be done. In the Greece situation an important question to ask is whether the country is a unique case qualifying for special treatment. To answer such questions we need to look at the bigger picture. To start with, is Greece a special case on the basis of degree of indebtedness? Its net public debt of over 175 per cent of output is the highest ratio in the eurozone. Italy is next with 135 per cent, followed by Portugal and Ireland at 120 per cent. So Greece can claim it has a debt burden greater than other members. However, there is no clear line beyond which debt burdens undermine an economy’s growth potential – especially if other metrics of debt sustainability look relatively more favourable. On the latter point the European Commission calculates that Greek interest payments will equal 4.2 per cent of output this year. That is notably less than Portugal with 5.0 per cent or Italy on 4.5 per cent, and similar to Ireland with 3.8 per cent. The reason for this is official loans to Greece were granted at below-market rates. Additionally, since the average maturity of Greece’s debt portfolio post-restructuring is greater than in other peripheral countries (about twice Portugal’s and more than twice Italy’s), it faces lower roll-over risks for years to come. Hence a barista in Milan may well ask why Greece deserves special treatment. What is more, according to the latest IMF forecasts, if Greece sticks to the Troika programme, its debt to output ratio will come down to 135 per cent by 2019. Thus within five years its debt ratio could be the same as Italy’s today. By then Greece’s primary surplus is supposed to be 4.2 per cent of output, less than the five per cent predicted for Italy that is expected to still carry debt worth 126 per cent of GDP. Similarly, Portugal is expected to have debt of 119 per cent of output in 2019. Of course the accuracy of these official forecasts is critical in judging the likelihood of such developments. Nevertheless the metrics above hardly seem sufficient to single out Greece as requiring debt forgiveness, particularly as it would have to be granted by the likes of Italy which is almost in the same boat – thus increasing its own net debt further. What about the argument that Greece should be forgiven its debts so it can spend more money spurring growth? According to European Commission forecasts, Greece should run a nearly balanced budget this year with a primary balance of 4.1 per cent. But what government would not prefer to spend its primary surplus rather than pay creditors, particularly foreign ones? Likewise the argument that Greece needs a fiscal stimulus because the ECB’s monetary policy is constrained by a lower bound on nominal interest rates applies to other eurozone members as well. A better justification for debt forgiveness might be Greece’s Konzept 22 ranks of unemployed. Last year the unemployment rate reached 27 per cent. The only other eurozone country that comes close is Spain with 25 per cent of its labour force out of work. Unemployment is particularly severe among the young and there is a risk of creating a lost generation. But again, if debt forgiveness brings jobs back, Spain and Greece should be treated no differently. And what about Portugal with 15 per cent unemployment – should it fund relief outside its borders? Hence arguments for debt forgiveness have to be made on other grounds. Greece would need to argue that spending money via debt write-offs in distressed economies creates a virtuous cycle. The private sector recovers faster and puts the economy on a growth path superior to what would be achievable with the original debt burden. Creditors themselves might prefer this as it increases their debtor’s creditworthiness. This argument sounds like it’s a free lunch and is hard to prove before or even after the event. For creditors it means a certain loss now in exchange for uncertain gains in the future. The question then is: how likely is Greece to make these future gains? In terms of competitiveness the country had been declining relative to its eurozone partners from its 2001 entry into the union up until the financial crisis. The crisis caused a sharp internal devaluation that has allowed Greece to regain some competitiveness while staying inside the eurozone. It has been a painful process. Unfortunately a big part of this readjustment has merely been the reversal of the credit-fuelled wage growth of prior years. In any case, there are few grounds to suppose competitiveness will suddenly rebound if government debt is forgiven. Many believe the most morally compelling reason for sovereign debt forgiveness for countries such as Greece lies in some kind of solidarity with less wealthy nations. Without large debt burdens countries are more likely to lift themselves up to prosperity by spending on health, education and infrastructure. Hence debt relief could be seen as a form of foreign aid. Indeed this very approach has been applied to developing countries by official institutions ranging from the IMF and World Bank to the African Development Bank. But Greece is hardly poor. Despite the painful adjustment the population has gone through, the country remains relatively rich. In real terms Greece’s output per capita has fallen by a quarter since 2007 but is only six per cent below the 2001 level when Greece joined the eurozone. The reality is that much of its rapid growth in the early 2000s, far above peers, was not supported by fundamentals. In contrast Italy’s output per capita is now a tenth below its 2001 level – a worse long-term relative change than Greece. 23 Debt forgiveness—a European dilemma And despite Greece’s output per capita in terms of purchasing power standards having fallen relative to other eurozone members since the financial crisis, it has stabilised recently at the same level of Slovakia and Estonia, and only ten per cent below Portugal. Looked at this way it is not surprising that Slovakia, then the poorest eurozone member, refused to participate in the original bailout of Greece on the grounds that “poor countries shouldn’t pay for the profligacy of richer peers”. Also note that relative to Romania and Bulgaria – two EU countries in the same geographical and cultural space – Greece’s output per capita in purchasing power terms is a third and nearly two-thirds higher, respectively. Indeed if the issue of debt forgiveness is to be considered in terms of relative wealth at all, such arguments surely hold within a nation’s borders too. For example, in middle-income countries such as Greece, why not hit richer domestic residents with a wealth tax? This could provide meaningful debt relief without hurting the weaker members of society. It is a philosophical question whether foreign assistance should be a first or last resort when pockets of domestic wealth remain. In short, none of the arguments above for debt relief is entirely satisfactory. Hence the only convincing justifications must be based on economics. By far the best of these is that debt relief buys time for meaningful structural reforms to be implemented and take effect. What is more, creditors are more likely to be willing to provide targeted aid rather than forgive the debt of a government they cannot completely trust. And in the eurozone’s case, creditor nations do not even seem to have a mandate from their own taxpayers to forgive debt granted at generous conditions only recently. Another economic reason to forgive debt is the prevention of contagion. While foreign bank exposures to Greece are much smaller than in 2012, the “ring-fencing” of a member state is wishful thinking. Systemic jitters could easily return should growth concerns override the current excitement surrounding quantitative easing. Also, the recent shock appreciation of the Swiss franc serves as a powerful reminder to Germany of the pressures its export sector would face were it not shielded by periphery nations. For Greece itself there are no easy options. Staying in the eurozone under a reform program is a painful prospect. But things would probably get much worse before they got better if Greece exited the single currency area. Following Argentina’s default in 2001, the government removed the currency peg to the dollar and the peso moved from parity to almost four, output fell by ten per cent and inflation jumped to 41 per cent. Greeks would need to ask themselves how much pain they are prepared to suffer to control their own economic policy. How would Greek depositors feel after a redenomination of their euro deposits? Konzept 24 Assuming exit is in nobody’s interest, how best then to find a compromise to appeal to all sides? For creditors, debt forgiveness is politically less appealing than, say, restructuring government debt into a zero-interest perpetuity, even if the two are economically equivalent. Since Greece’s existing loans carry below- market interest rates, one option is a maturity extension that would reduce the present value of the debt while optically resulting in no cost to lenders. Of course, there is never a free lunch. The example above is an effective wealth transfer from creditors to the sovereign borrower via a longer and inadequately compensated exposure to Greece’s risk as well as the potential impact on the creditor’s own funding costs. Another option is temporary interest relief, ostensibly to spark a rise in demand and employment. The risk here is that governments can always eke out a little growth by hiring workers or paying higher salaries. However, the sustainability of such growth would be rather doubtful. Only a combination of a counter-cyclical stimulus and reforms can yield long-term benefits. Indeed common to most scenarios whereby Greece gets its debt position under control is a reliance on the so-called growth dividend, whereby incremental output helps with interest payments as well as amortisation of the principal. Therefore, perhaps another politically acceptable approach to consider would be to link official loans to economic growth. This has in fact been proposed by the Greek side. Indexing the debt to output preserves the upside for creditors while giving Greece contingent debt relief on the downside. Again, the terms of any economic growth-contingent debt restructuring matter. The key point is that if its terms reflected the true probabilities of macroeconomic developments the expected repayments to creditors should not change much. Hence in effect there would be little debt relief. On the other hand, if the terms were favourable to the debtor (for example, in extremis, a reduction of all debt if the growth rate falls below zero), such a restructuring represents an effective transfer of wealth from creditors to the debtor. In conclusion, win-win debt restructurings are rather elusive. As for Greece, it seems likely that any potential deal will include a quid-pro-quo restructuring – improved terms in return for reforms – rather than debt write-off. One side, or perhaps even both, will end up disappointed. However, while outright debt cancellation is unlikely, some form of debt relief likely remains the ultimate debt management tool for this most distressed part of the periphery. The key to debt sustainability is nominal economic growth. In the end, the success of Europe is impossible without that. With the ECB operating near the limit of its powers, government growth policies – including structural reforms – are the only hope left. 25 Debt forgiveness—a European dilemma European voters in debt-laden sovereigns are increasingly calling for debt forgiveness without which they do not believe their economies have a chance of a rebirth. The popularity of political parties making this case – described below – in Greece (Syriza), Spain (Podemos) and Ireland (Sinn Féin) is testimony to this view. All eyes are currently focused on the newly elected Greek coalition government headed by Syriza. Its main objective is renegotiating the Memorandum of Understanding between Greece and its international lenders. Syriza‘s central demands include: a present value reduction in sovereign debt, restoring wages and minimum pensions to pre-crisis levels; a reversal of electricity and oil privatisations; rent and mortgage subsidies for those who cannot afford to pay their share; free healthcare and a significant job creation programme. Syriza seeks a European solution to the sovereign debt issue. It has established strong links with radical left parties across Europe and seeks to create a common bloc to end austerity, lighten the debt burden, create employment and strengthen the welfare state. Podemos is a new political party in Spain founded in 2014. The party’s membership has grown sharply in the space of a few months and puts it neck and neck with the ruling party – a startling result given that to date two parties have ruled Spain since democracy was restored 40 years ago. Podemos is headed by Pablo Iglesias, a professor of political science. Its main agenda is to fight inequality and corruption by establishing a basic income for everyone, as well as pay caps, while promoting small enterprise and fighting corporate tax-avoidance. Podemos seeks to amend article 135 of the Spanish Constitution under which the state is bound to service sovereign debt ahead of any other debts. The party sees this as relinquishing the country’s sovereignty to the European Union. Debt politics in Europe Konzept 26 Irish left-wing opposition party Sinn Féin, like Syriza, wishes to create a common front against austerity policies within the European Union. Sinn Féin, formerly the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, is opposed to the austerity that Ireland had to go through as part of its international bailout in 2010. According to opinion polls, Sinn Féin enjoys support at roughly similar levels to Ireland’s two traditionally dominant parties. The party’s objectives include introducing an economic stimulus package to increase economic activity, lowering unemployment and reducing unsustainable deficits, protecting the most vulnerable in society and introducing higher taxes for the wealthy. Tempo de Avançar is a new political movement in Portugal modelled on Syriza. It is supported by leftist political groups including the new LIVRE party founded by Rui Tavares, a historian, Forum Manifesto, MIC Porto and Renovação Comunista. The movement’s objective is to fight job insecurity, to reconstruct the welfare state and to renegotiate sovereign debt – including that of Portugal. In contrast to Greece, Spain and Ireland, there is less support for radical new movements in Portugal. 27 Debt forgiveness—a European dilemma Sovereign default—a case study from 16th century Spain Konzept 28 Philip II, King of Spain from 1556 to 1598, ruled an empire over which the sun never set and managed a budget on a scale not seen since the height of the Roman Empire. His kingdom’s riches were so vast that in Spanish history the 16th century is referred to as the “golden century”. Yet in the world of finance, Philip II is remembered as the first serial defaulter of sovereign debt, eventually triggering Spain’s downfall, from which it only recovered in the late twentieth century. Jean-Paul Calamaro Konzept29 How could such wealth be reconciled with such a calamitous financial record? How could bankers have been so irrational as to lend time after time to such an appalling borrower? For the better part of five centuries, historians have been scathing about Philip II’s governance and they blame him for triggering Spain’s decline. Until recently that is. Indeed, historians and economists have pored over financial records of the 16th century and have produced unprecedented research leading to a significant re-write of history. Digging into the details of this research, modern day bankers may be surprised by the sophistication of the financial system in 16th century Spain. Concepts such as the time value of money, the pricing of future debt restructurings implied by the markets, loan collateralisation and asset backed securitisation were known and commonly used back then. And importantly, modern financiers and politicians may learn from the pragmatic approaches and strategies their counterparts in the middle-ages used for the long term prosperity of both lender and borrower. 1 Historians have long viewed the state finances under Philip II as nothing short of calamitous, and in the hands of an incapable administration. In their opinion the king squandered the wealth plundered in the Indies – as the Spanish Americas were called at the time, amassed dizzying levels of debt and did not invest productively in Spain’s economy, all for the sake of his unconstrained imperial ambitions. Historians blame him for his inability to stop the uncontrolled growth of sovereign debt, for the lack of transparency in government finances and for the massive imbalances between revenue and expenditure. They believe his actions triggered the steady decline of Spain, relegating the most powerful country in the world to a peripheral backwater from which it did not recover until the latter part of the twentieth century. 2, 3 Nothing illustrates the hopelessness of Philip II’s administration more than the events surrounding the third and biggest default, in 1575. Just prior to this default, the president of the Council of Finance sent a long report to the King on the status of finances: “It was written in large print and spelled everything out in elementary detail, as for someone totally ignorant of the subject.” To understand the royal finances, the report began, “it was necessary to consider four things: 1) what it is that we have; 2) what it is that we owe; 3) what is left to us, what is lacking, and what we need; 4) where and how we will provide it, putting it to execution”. 4 The report’s author acknowledged the superiority of bankers in assessing the fiscal health of the Crown and described the Royal treasury officials’ “lack of order in books and papers, their bad diligence and low reliability.” 5 Even the King himself candidly told his secretary “I have never been able to get this Konzept 30 business of loans and interests into my head. I have never managed to understand it”. 6 Imperial hegemony was not just a goal but an obsession for the King – he was at war for all but a brief six month period during his long 42 year reign. Military success was primarily a function of financial muscle. The power that could sustain spending the longest during a conflict usually won. Philip II topped his rivals with his will to commit resources for this purpose, including those mortgaged against potential but uncertain victories. Approximately three quarters of the Crown’s revenues were used for financing the military. 5 Income growth lagged behind expenditure in spite of the wealth brought from the Indies. As a result, debt issuance was erratic and typically highly concentrated around military expeditions. Financial markets were showered with large amounts of debt in a brief period of time. The flooding of debt converted many Spaniards into rentiers, who deserted commerce for the noble life. 7 The nominal stock of debt over the course of Philip II’s reign increased fivefold. The regressive tax system – taxes were non-existent for the nobility yet stifling for the many – triggered a concentration of wealth and a deep divide between tax exempt rentiers and the rest of the population. Bouts of tax increases to finance the military threw even more people into debt who turned to rentiers for financing. A recurrent allocation of capital to unproductive resources sowed the seeds of the empire’s decline. 2 In aggregate, the Crown was long silver amassed from the colonies and short gold needed to pay for its war effort in the northern countries. Bankers facilitated the Crown’s payments by letters of exchange in addition to providing exchange services for (non-convertible) Spanish currency. In turn, they exported Spain’s silver to satisfy China’s insatiable demand. 8 Thus the colonies’ riches merely passed through Spain but did not contribute directly to its economic development. Moreover, the country was chronically short of essential goods and could not feed itself. It had to import basic staples needed to feed its population, wood and cloth (for the construction of navy ships) and other industrial goods. It ran large deficits and did not control rampant inflation at home. Beyond the ineptitude of Philip II and his administration, historians’ earlier work also views the King’s bankers as irrational. Academics could not justify how a King could default so often and still manage to borrow so much. Nor could they explain why bankers continued to lend to a kingdom in such hopeless fiscal position. Worse, they could not understand why bankers kept taking more sovereign debt despite repeatedly incurring losses on it. 9 31 Sovereign default—a case study from 16th century Spain 1557 1596 15601575 Konzept 32 But the latest research suggests that Philip II’s defaults in 1557, 1560, 1575 and 1596 were not outright bankruptcies but partial and temporary suspensions of Crown payments with mild haircuts by today’s standards. Following each “bankruptcy” settlements were negotiated and lending resumed quickly. Neither the King nor the bankers were irresponsible or irrational, the former in his borrowing, the latter in their lending. 33 Sovereign default—a case study from 16th century Spain So the story goes of this period of history that combined the largest empire since Roman times, the largest plunder of wealth known to date with the most financially incompetent of royal administrations, all in one. But the latest research suggests that Philip II’s defaults in 1557, 1560, 1575 and 1596 were not outright bankruptcies but partial and temporary suspensions of Crown payments with mild haircuts by today’s standards. Following each “bankruptcy” settlements were negotiated and lending resumed quickly. Neither the King nor the bankers were irresponsible or irrational, the former in his borrowing, the latter in their lending. An understanding of the financial system in place at the time helps to see why. The Spanish Crown drew over half of its revenues from Castile (80 per cent of modern-day Spain) and these were the most stable and highest quality earnings received. Silver from the Indies, on the other hand, provided one fifth of revenues but was volatile and unreliable. The rest were provided by extraordinary taxes. Eighteen cities and their surrounding regions in Castile controlled the highest quality taxes for servicing the Crown’s debt. Their contribution was set through collective bargaining with the Crown in parliament (Cortes). The Cortes could only meet at the King’s request and had no control of the Crown’s expenditure. They had however, significant influence over fiscal revenue – no increase in contribution could be carried out without the majority agreement of the cities. City contributions were committed to and fixed for six years and each increase the King asked for required lengthy negotiations. 10 Crucially, Castile’s large and stable tax base was the backbone of Philipp II’s long-term debt instruments called juros. Juros were backed by tax revenue. To warrant their credibility, they were serviced at the city level by the same office responsible for collecting local sales tax revenues. They had first claim on these revenues and were ranked by order of seniority according to their date of issuance. They were an attractive form of investment for the Castilian nobility and provided a Royal license could be obtained, they could be traded via fee-based registered sales and transfers. Juros were typically perpetual and redeemable. The redeemable feature enabled the Crown to refinance when interest rates decreased. Such refinancings were not achieved by a reduction of the coupon but by a rise in the loan principal – the interest rate reduction kept the annual income constant but required additional funds from the lender known as crecimiento. Thus the value of juros in the secondary market depended on the perceived credit worthiness of the Crown, proximity to the revenue pool given by the date of issuance, expected long term rates and future expectations of crecimientos. While investors at Konzept 34 the time did not have sophisticated tools at their disposal to derive these factors from the market, they were aware of them and applied good judgement in pricing them. 10 To smooth out revenue variability and satisfy erratic borrowing needs, the Crown issued short term debt called asientos. Asientos were of lower quality than juros and were typically backed by shipments of silver from the Indies. Growing remittances of silver encouraged large scale short-term borrowing. As most ordinary taxes were committed to the service of juros, silver was the largest component of the Crown’s free cash-flow. Some asientos were collateralised by juros – a useful feature which acted as a safety valve during periods of perceived financial stress. During such periods, holders would convert asientos into much safer juros and in turn sell these for cash. The stock of short-term debt would shrink and pressure on both borrower and creditors would diminish overall. Sizeable dips in remittances of silver seem to have contributed to the Crown’s financial difficulties. But the trigger point was the service of juros reaching the debt ceiling of city tax payments. As long as the ceiling was not reached, the Crown could issue more juros. Once the ceiling was reached asientos could not be converted into juros and a crisis took place. Each of the financial crises under Philip II started precisely when that happened. The King then declared a suspension of payments on asientos and lengthy negotiations with the Cortes followed. At the end of each crisis, outstanding asientos were converted into long-term juros, net of any principal reduction. Why was the Crown free to amass such large debt for which it is much criticised? Each city in Castile was free to collect its committed tax revenue without interference from the Crown and each city ran a well administered tax collateralised lending program. This reinforced the Crown’s ability to borrow because it restricted its ability to divert tax revenues away from servicing the debt. This enabled the Crown to increase the domestic debt to a level that was unprecedented in the 16th century. Interestingly, the crises had no adverse effect on long-term debt interest rates – historical records show that the Crown honoured its debts in juros. 8 Thus financial cunning and sophistication, not folly, allowed debts to grow. The structure of the financial system in place explains why the Crown had repeated debt crises and why these were for the most part seen as temporary rebalancing exercises. Labelling these crises as outright bankruptcies therefore seems inappropriate. In a typical debt crisis, output declines, unemployment surges and occasionally massive bailouts are needed. Austerity settles in with the usual spending cuts and tax increases. Instead of boom-and-bust cycles of typical debt crises, Philip II’s administration showed that such crises could effectively be dealt with in a different 35 Sovereign default—a case study from 16th century Spain In a typical debt crisis, output declines, unemployment surges and occasionally massive bailouts are needed. Austerity settles in with the usual spending cuts and tax increases. Instead of boom-and-bust cycles of typical debt crises, Philip II’s administration showed that such crises could effectively be dealt with in a different way. Konzept 36 way that did not destabilise the financial system: high quality, well administered long-term debt issuance combined with lower quality short-term debt to absorb shocks; checks and balances to limit the Crown’s borrowing effectively (think Maastricht criteria for European Union countries being systematically enforced); syndicated lending to widely share sovereign risk; negotiated reductions of outstanding debt – whether through interest rate reduction, maturity extension or outright but moderate haircuts. All contributed to ensuring a steady supply of willing creditors that financed the Spanish monarchy. 5 But there is more. During most of his reign Philip II ran a primary surplus. Debt rose quickly, but so did revenue. Contrary to the mainstream view Philip II’s debts were sustainable. The King ran a primary deficit only twice largely because of military- related shocks. One of these was the defeat of the “Invincible Armada”. The building of a enormous fleet to invade England and its subsequent rebuilding following a disastrous campaign was extremely expensive, at two years’ worth of royal revenue. 5 Yet such dreadful expense did not lead to bankruptcy. Nor did it deter the King from pursuing military adventures elsewhere. This speaks volumes about the depth of his borrowing capacity and the strength of the financial system to back him. Lastly, Philip II almost never borrowed to pay interest despite nearly continuous warfare. Instead, a substantial proportion of his revenues were available for servicing his debts, year after year. 5 During his reign Philip II borrowed mostly from the bankers of Genoa, in modern day Italy. Genoese bankers had a near-monopoly over juro issuance and thus controlled the King’s critical access to long-term debt. They also dominated the asiento business as well as transfers and foreign exchange operations. 5 To service the King the Genoese had an extensive network of depositors throughout Europe, the capacity to integrate lending, conduct forex operations and provide insurance services throughout Western Europe and the Mediterranean. The Genoese acted as a powerful cartel of some 40 families in the sense that they shared sovereign risk through multiple and overlapping loans to the Crown and acted as a group when faced with Crown payment suspensions. They were successful in getting the Crown to quickly settle its arrears most of the time. Individual bankers within or outside of the cartel did not pursue bilateral negotiations with the Crown for fear of losing out on future business or for fear of being marginalised in debt restructuring negotiations. As an example, during the financial crisis of 1575 Philip II attempted to circumvent the Genoese’s funds blockade, by shipping specie and by attempting to lure defectors from the Genoese-led coalition to make transfers. Neither measure was 37 Sovereign default—a case study from 16th century Spain successful and in the end Philip II repaid his lenders. 8 Genoese bankers proved very effective in their negotiations with the Crown. There is no evidence that recurrent lending to Philip II was an act of irrationality. But rather a high yield strategy finally balanced with occasional and moderate haircuts. In all, the bankers benefited substantially from their relationship with Philip II but their collective power and skill were critical to achieve this. Still, it is difficult to brush off the unflattering comments about Philip II entirely. In particular, historians blame his obstinate and dogmatic stance towards other nations for wasting the Crown’s riches in never ending wars. The exceptional wealth the country was showered with was by and large wasted on military campaigns and did not contribute to the country’s industrial development. Historians also point to a number of factors that contributed to the decline of the Spanish empire for centuries to come. These include: the lack of centralised government, the growth of a class of rentiers that possessed an increasing share of the wealth of the nation that was not put to productive use, the ineptitude of Philip II’s successors and their administration. There is, however, another side to Philip II. The King was an accomplished administrator. Despite being at war virtually during his entire reign, he preferred the study to the battlefield. He worked his way through thousands of documents and carefully annotated them. He analysed all aspects of an issue, soliciting and weighing different opinions before reaching a decision. This detail- oriented approach to decision making earned him the name “the prudent King”. 5 As for the Genoese bankers, they did rather well on their loans, ex post, in spite of serial debt reductions. 10 Perhaps surprisingly, some modern European governments might learn a thing or two from this extraordinary episode in Spain over four centuries ago. 1 This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff (2011) 2 Finanzas, Deuda Pública y Confianza en el Gobierno de España bajo Los Austrias, Álvaro Espina, Hacienda Pública Española, 2001 3 Historia de España, Pierre Vilar (2001) 4 Fiscal Crises, Liberty and Representative Government, 1450-1789, Philip T. Hoffman, Kathryn Norberg (1994) 5 Lending to the Borrower from Hell: Debt and Default in the Age of Philipp II, Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth, 2014 6 Philip II Geoffrey Woodward, Seminar Stories in History, 2013 7 Economic and Financial Crises and Transformations in Sixteenth-Century Europe, Charles P. Kindleberger, 1998 8 The Sustainable Debts of Philip II: A Reconstruction of Spain’s Fiscal Position 1560-1598, Mauricio Drelichman, Hans-Joachim Voth, 2010 9 The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Fernand Braudel (1966) 10 Debt policy under constraints: Philip II, the Cortes, and Genoese bankers, Carlos Álvarez-Nogal, Christophe Chamley, 2014 Konzept 38 39 Sovereign default—a case study from 16th century Spain European fiscal union— at a crossroads Konzept 40 The eurozone is an ongoing process. No final step will complete the project, but many steps will keep it going. A currency area is optimal when for every country the cost of leaving is perceived to be higher than the cost of staying in. What these costs are, and what the exact meaning of “leaving” or “staying in” is at any point in time is subject to change and assessment. There is no fixed state of affairs. Instead, the eurozone is in constant flux where all players involved continuously come to the conclusion to continue to participate. Alexander Düring, Nicolaus Heinen, Barbara Böttcher Konzept41 Yet a “state of affairs” view guided the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty. After passing a few stringent tests, countries would pass through the door of monetary union and live there happily ever after. Bound by rules that would ensure growth and stability, these countries would enjoy the absence of frictional costs of multiple currencies – as they do in textbooks. But the launch of the euro was marked by overt and covert circumnavigation of the entry criteria, which was followed by poor monitoring. It was believed that the obvious benefits would remove all doubts about the future. The financial crisis blew away this steady state view. Stabilisation measures, starting from bilateral loans to Greece began. Each new crisis was met with another structure. Not only is it now clear the eurozone requires closer integration, that process has also turned out not to be as self-determined as the original treaties suggest. For example, financial markets have probed – and found wanting – the degree of fiscal integration accompanying monetary union. In response, member states introduced fiscal measures inside and parallel to the treaty framework to stabilise the currency. While these new tools address crisis situations, more is required to prevent creeping divergence. Why is closer fiscal union crucial to the livelihood of the euro? Because it better absorbs asymmetric shocks to the system. While it is important to realise that fiscal integration needs to be deepened, there are multiple ways in which this can be done. The fully-fledged integration of budgets is the extreme approach, but not the only way to move forward. Below we consider the four different forms of integration that are, or have been discussed based on both sides of sovereign balance sheets. The first approach is the status quo set out in the original European treaty. Here fiscal policies on both the spending and borrowing sides of a member country’s balance sheet are set independently of other members. This is essentially a “rules union” where a common set of fiscal rules coordinate policies to prevent moral hazard and future crises. In 1997 the heads of state and governments agreed to perpetuate the fiscal thresholds for entry into the European Monetary Union into a permanent framework of fiscal surveillance (Stability and Growth Pact). Being the oldest element of the fiscal union does not mean this rules-based approach was successful. The pact was supposed to inspire confidence in government finances but was flouted enthusiastically. Its credibility suffers because member states refuse to surrender sovereignty over major elements of Konzept 42 fiscal policy. At the same time, sanctions that were supposed to prevent misconduct under the pact were never applied in full. Nor have these shortcomings been cured with the extension of the fiscal and economic surveillance framework introduced in the course of the euro crisis. These subsequent reforms looked promising at first but in the end their effectiveness has been limited by a lack of political will on a European level to make full use of the rules. For instance, the fiscal adjustment paths that are prescribed to each member country were extended at various times. And compliance among states has remained limited. For example, last October the European Commission published an assessment of the success of economic policy coordination. According to the survey only one per cent of all measures were “fully implemented” and just a tenth had shown “substantial progress”. The second possible form of fiscal integration is a joint approach on the liability side of the balance sheet – that is common funding across the eurozone, but not common spending. A single currency without joint funding was always a gamble. The risk was that governments remain dependent on private funding via capital markets and that markets could withhold it. Hence in reaction to the turmoil in 2010 a closer fiscal union from a funding perspective gathered renewed momentum. For example, Greece was granted emergency loans that amounted to an ex-post mutualisation of debt. These loans morphed into the bailout mechanisms – the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism. The latter is a permanent structure that followed a change in the treaties in order to make such aid compatible with the European legal framework. Until then, mutual guarantees among eurozone countries had been illegal. While legal impediments were addressed to some degree at the German Constitutional Court as well as the European Court of Justice, political impediments were on the rise. The mutual guarantees were controversial, particularly in core countries. Resistance from the Finnish and the German parliament was severe and in reality the scope for fiscal guarantee mechanisms seems exhausted. As a reaction, the European Central Bank has taken on an ever more important role in stabilising government funding costs. To the extent these measures amount to a fiscal union, they are all fiscal union ex-post – debts become mutualised long after they have been incurred. Despite this resistance, ideas for common funding 43 European fiscal union—at a crossroads While it is important to realise that fiscal integration needs to be deepened, there are multiple ways in which this can be done. Konzept 44 mechanisms abound. Joint debt instruments, generally known as eurobonds, were proposed in many forms. For example the allocation of resources raised by such a bond – perhaps in the case of a severe economic downturn in a member state – could easily be decided at the European Union level. That said, recent nonconventional policy measures being undertaken by the ECB have reduced the pressure to implement such joint funding schemes for now. Hence for the time being joint funding is unlikely to materialise. But that does not mean progress on fiscal union is impossible. Instead, the argument has migrated from joint funding to a mix of coordinated and joint spending. Flipping to the opposite side of the balance sheet now, this is the third possible approach to fiscal integration based on transfer mechanisms such as unemployment insurance or investment spending. Unemployment insurance, for example, would act as an automatic fiscal stabiliser between countries, with the added benefit of interrupting the negative feedback loop between higher unemployment and higher deficits. The idea is that in the event of an economic downturn and rising unemployment, additional transfers to the unemployed would partly come from a common unemployment scheme. Current proposals mostly refer to a transfer system between countries with high and low unemployment rates in order to create a countercyclical stimulus. Again there is currently no consensus among member states on the need for such an instrument, making its realisation unlikely. One solution would be to combine a common unemployment insurance with additional fiscal transfers and link these to reforms. But given the flouted conditionalities under the rescue packages since the crisis, it is hard to imagine core countries signing up to insurance linked to reforms either. Indeed reforms lie at the heart of common spending policies. An initial step in this direction was the cash-for-reforms proposal put forward by Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande back in June 2013. That proposal held out the idea that countries could receive fiscal support in return for achieving concrete structural reform goals. However, prospective beneficiaries of this scheme rejected the idea of having their domestic policies judged by outsiders. Whereas joint funding without implicit support of the ECB is only possible if member countries can credibly signal a willingness to achieve fiscal sustainability in the long run, joint spending can only spur the economy if both investors and consumers know that there is something resembling a long-term plan for credible economic reforms and sound fiscal policies. Thus any attempt at cash-for-reforms will inevitably suffer 45 European fiscal union—at a crossroads from the fact that none of the variants of fiscal union outlined above has so far been implemented. Extending common funding mechanisms is politically controversial. Common spending will be subject to political distribution battles and questions of democratic legitimacy. Making common spending policies conditional upon compliance with common rules does not solve the problem either as the rules would be politically biased towards those countries that dominate the distribution. To conclude, it is obvious that a fully-fledged funding and spending fiscal integration (approach four) is barely worth considering as yet. And even common funding or spending unions are some way off. The current rules based equilibrium is suboptimal, but at least stable. Hence while there is excited debate at the moment about a common spending approach, surely credible reforms to the rules-based framework should remain the focus for now. 46Konzept Columns 48 Book review—Exodus 49 Ideas lab—the moon 50 Conference spy—dbAccess China 51 Eurozone map rescaled for debt 47 Konzept To the debate on migration that is raging in Britain, economics has long had a straightforward answer: whatever happens to the indigenous population of the host country is irrelevant as long as everyone is better off. Because wealth comes from specialisation and trade, comparative advantage dictates open borders. Migration controls are unnecessary; the more immigrants the better. Oxford economist Professor Paul Collier’s new book Exodus is a thoughtful and persuasive rebuke to this view. He suggests that migration, despite adding to diversity, stimulus and choice, impacts social trust negatively. For him, therefore, tight migration controls are not merely an appeasement to an irate hoi polloi, but prevent the undermining of social trust. And social trust is the fabric that enables redistributive taxes – the wealthy are less likely to resent supporting those they see as part of their community – and fosters those institutions and norms that create public goods, (ie. that the market would not otherwise deliver). Collier cites Harvard economist Robert Putnam’s finding that the greater the proportion of immigrants in a US community, the lower was the mutual level of trust, altruism and cooperation. Likewise, Edward Miguel of Berkeley found that the more ethnically diverse a Kenyan village was, the less it was able to cooperate to maintain basic public goods such as a village well. Of course, all societies manage to extend trust within families and usually also to their local communities. But in rich countries trust needs to embrace far more people – one’s fellow citizens. Trust can be fragile. For instance, in Britain, the convention of an unarmed police is taken for granted, but depends on a tacit agreement between police and criminals that guns will not be used. In London in 2011 social trust in the police had eroded to the point that “the bonds between Afro-Caribbean people living in that locality were evidently stronger than any sense that...possessing a gun...breached a taboo.” Hence, the 2011 shooting by police of Mark Duggan, who had a handgun, triggered widespread riots. Collier is not suggesting that diversity has already endangered social trust – so far, he says, it has not. But, if migration continues at the pace it has, that is the inevitable outcome. The impact will be more severe in Europe because European countries are more cohesive than the US. Either you have mass immigration, or a generous welfare state – you cannot have both, an existential problem for the political left. So far so standard. The innovation in Collier’s book is his model on why migration from poor countries to rich ones is set to accelerate. First, the gap in incomes between the rich world and the poor will remain wide. Second, migration is an investment and many more countries are reaching a level of income at which a migrant can accumulate enough money to leave. Third, the cost of migration falls as the diasporas available to welcome migrants grow larger. The consequence is a period of several decades of what Collier imagines to be the “beginnings of disequilibrium of epic proportions,” in which the number of migrants will rise and rise before finally the income gap will be small enough to disincentivise migration. He compares it to global warming – a phenomenon we do not have adequate detail to model, but we already know will require policy changes to manage. Collier concludes that the current migration policy, which, in the UK at least, is focused on net migration, does not target the right variable, which is the size of the diaspora and whether it has become large enough to impact social trust. Since 2008, many certainties in the economics world have been overturned. Collier’s consistently provoking and thoughtful book is an intellectual insurgency trying to do the same with economic’s theories on migration. After the flood, the flood— a review of Paul Collier’s Exodus Sahil Mahtani Konzept 48 Travelling to the moon was sufficiently ridiculous in the ancient world that the second century satirist Lucian’s True History , a parody on the unreliability of ancient sources, sandwiched his characters’ journey to the moon between a voyage to a sea of milk, an island of cheese, and the underworld. It has not seemed so absurd since the 1969 moon landing. If recent discussions are anything to go by, there are plans to explore even further. Professor Ian Crawford of Birkbeck School of Earth and Planetary Sciences opened the 2015 Deutsche Bank Ideas lab series by exploring the possibilities of using resources on the moon for economic purposes. These include helium-3, hydrogen, helium-4, nitrogen and other elements. Of these, only helium-3 is unavailable on earth. There have been suggestions that helium-3 might be mined on the moon and imported back to earth where it could be used in future nuclear fusion reactors; it is also potentially useful for nuclear fusion power in space. However, the abundance of helium-3 on the moon is unclear, the nuclear reactors have not been proposed, let alone built, and it would require significant energy infrastructure to extract it from the moon. Despite the fact that in the long term it may only be by accessing space resources that the human burden on the earth’s biosphere can be reduced, the contributions of helium-3 are unlikely to be significant and, in Professor Crawford’s view, have been exaggerated. However, he was optimistic on the extraction of lunar water for potential space tourism. Water in the form of polar ice deposits could be used to extract oxygen and therefore sustain long-term settlement on the moon or for use in economic activity in the inner solar system. Water is heavy and difficult to export from earth. However, even here lunar extraction processes are quite energy intensive, requiring two to four megawatt-years of energy to produce 1,000 tonnes of oxygen. Space tourism itself is not such a wild idea given the launch of private sector programmes such as SpaceX, which have already reduced the cost of launching rockets by a factor of two. Professor Crawford envisaged that a decline in rocket costs by a factor of ten would be necessary to spur more frequent travel. He thought this achievable within 15-20 years. Meanwhile, the international and legal context of space travel is likely to have a significant bearing on how further voyages develop. Politically, no state is allowed to claim land or resources on the moon, according to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which has been signed by Russia and China. However, this is a treaty by nation-states and does not exclude extraction by private firms. Nevertheless, any extraction would have to be squared with the principle established by the OST that “the exploration and use of outer space…shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,” which implies some kind of international regulatory framework. No company will invest unless they have legal entitlement to the resources that are extracted. Finally, despite the possibilities of developing stronger ties to the moon, the state of our knowledge remains quite bare. No space mission has ever landed on the far side of the moon, nor its poles, for example. Only nine missions (six US and three Russian) have gathered rock-samples, and only from the equatorial regions. Moreover, until very recently travels to the moon have not advanced much beyond their first forays in the 1970s. Until a Chinese mission in 2013, it had been forty years since any mission landed on the moon. While there is much to discover, the challenge, in an increasingly multipolar world, will be for space exploration and development to reduce, not aggravate, tensions on earth. That is not a scientific challenge but a political one. Ideas lab—the moon Sahil Mahtani Konzept49 Conference spy— dbAccess China James Malcolm Deutsche Bank’s thirteenth annual Access China conference took place mid-January in Beijing. Missives depicted the atmosphere as “more subdued”, even “sombre”. Near-term risks were recognised as lying to the downside with a weak property market expected to weigh heavily on local government revenues and drag down public investment. Amidst tales of long-term foreign residents fleeing to Hong Kong, economic growth projections beginning with the number six populated many discussions. Bad demographics also featured more prominently this year. One presentation showed the ratio of working age population to dependents plummeting from 5:1 to 2:1 from 2000 to 2030. Calibrating an appropriate response is seen as the main challenge for policymakers. This was a far cry from the conference two years ago when – in the midst of some of the worst Beijing air pollution on record – eight per cent growth was described by most presenters as an absolute floor. The incoming Xi-Li administration was expected to promote a heady mixture of reform and urbanisation, transporting the economy almost painlessly to a better balanced, consumption-driven future. Growth in shadow banking was celebrated as evidence of healthy market-driven credit disintermediation, and concerns about overcapacity in heavy industrial sectors garnered nary a mention. While in a recent survey 85 per cent of locals foresee no financial crisis in the next five years (compared with two-thirds of foreigners), bulls on China do seem to have pulled in their horns. Even so they remain optimistic. Slower growth today merely implies more room to cut interest rates, with broad-based monetary easing through a reduction of banks’ required reserves. Meanwhile, the prospect of further declines in property prices portends more funds flowing into the stock market. Financial deregulation and faster capital account liberalisation promise myriad new opportunities. Bulls at the conference also expect fresh inflows as no global investor will be able ignore a market of China’s size and when it gets incorporated in benchmark stock and bond indices. And why worry about tail risk when the Chinese government has so much at stake? Misgivings were voiced tentatively by a few speakers but deserve greater attention. Credit is still growing faster than output growth, meaning deleveraging has yet to begin. State-owned enterprise reform has barely been broached. Private companies suffer overcapacity too – for example one steel manufacturer with 40,000 employees was mentioned as needing only 18,000. The anti-corruption campaign has morphed into more of a purge, targeting foreign firms, restricting press freedom and potentially impeding the ability of technocrats to function effectively. Popular expectations have also soared, with people wealthier, better educated and more able to share grievances over the internet and new social media. The latter is hardly surprising given that a quarter of school leavers now go on to higher education versus just three per cent in 1990. Against this backdrop only one thing is sure: more will change over the next two years than during the previous two, and the consequences of misreading the situation will go up dramatically. A “new normal” was the buzzword at the conference but it will surely be anything but. Watch this space and make a date in your diary for the next dbAccess China conference. Konzept 50 Eurozone map rescaled for debt Country size rescaled by sovereign debt per head Country size rescaled by the ECB’s planned bond purchases per head 51 Konzept The information and opinions in this report were prepared by Deutsche Bank AG or one of its affiliates (collectively “Deutsche Bank”). The information herein is believed to be reliable and has been obtained from public sources believed to be reliable. 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In addition, the undersigned lead analysts have not and will not receive any compensation for providing a specific recommendation or view in this report: John Tierney, Bilal Hafeez, Daniel Brehon, Rod Lache, Jochen Gehrke, James Malcolm, Michal Jezek, Alexander Düring, Jean-Paul Calamaro, Nicolaus Heinen, Barbara Böttcher, Sahil Mahtani. Konzept 52